Although issues relating to replication and open science have received a great deal of recent attention, relatively little discussion has been devoted to how these issues intersect with considerations of diversity and inclusion.  In an earlier post, I argued that one reason that diversity is valuable in science is because it can introduce diversity of thought.  Freedom of thought and expression are core scientific values, but people who are different in any way can trigger the opposite reaction: resentment and distrust because “they” are not like “us” or because “they” do not conform.

It has been suggested that women have been targeted disproportionately in the zeal for replicability and open science. I am not aware of any scientific studies to support that claim. However, it is time to begin to think about these issues.  How does trust enter into judgments about scientific credibility?  Whom do we trust; are some groups of people seen as more credible than others?  Are the motives of critics always ethical, or does professional jealousy enter into these discussions of replicability?  When women or minorities become famous, does that provoke more acute jealousy or resentment?  I sure hope the answer is “no” to all of these questions, especially for members of the Psychonomic Society who are supposed to be committed to rigor and objectivity.

However, recent events made me wonder. I asked Stephan Lewandowsky to tweet out a couple of links about Amy Cuddy’s latest meta-analysis on power posing, along with a Forbes article discussing the gendered aspects of this controversy.  I am not sufficiently knowledgeable to have an informed opinion about the power-posing controversy, but, as a scientific society, we should be open to hearing both sides. The irony does not escape me that this research aimed at helping women and other groups feel more powerful seems to have inspired unusually sharp criticism.

Regardless of whether this criticism is warranted, our responsibility is to communicate different views about scientific debates. No one should live in fear that he or she cannot share information that a more recent, more inclusive meta-analysis showed that an effect replicated.  Yet, some members were angry at me simply for sharing this information.  I am not sure why they were so angry, but I think we all need to think about this emotional reaction to sharing this information.  Why so emotional?  In response to the outrage, the Society quickly shared a critique of Cuddy’s peer-reviewed analysis.  The critique was not peer-reviewed and had no new data.  Nevertheless, the critique made some good points.  Thus, the word “inclusion” in the title of our Committee should reflect our commitment as a Society to listening to different views.

Another factor may have been at play in this controversy: fame.  Nowadays, we encourage outreach and communication with the public.  That is why we do blogposts such as this one and have a Digital Editor for the Psychonomic Society.  Indeed, many universities pretty much require this kind of self-promotion.

Then, we resent people who are good at it.  We love to hate those who write popular books, appear in the media, give TED talks, and are so-called public intellectuals. Amy Cuddy appears to have been guilty of some of these offenses.

To be sure, many in the movement for replicability and open science have noble motives.  I want to stipulate that replication is a good thing.  We could use more methodological rigor.  (We could also use more reading of the literature, more theory, and more openness to diverse ideas.)

However, there are some troubling aspects to the current emphasis on being “righteous” (as one of our Board members called it).  Human beings tend to attribute lower levels of rigor (or any good quality) to “them” as opposed to “us.”  It is so much easier to appreciate the righteousness of those who look at the world exactly as we do.

We also need to consider more civil and constructive ways to address our shortcomings as a field. There are diverse ways of addressing the issue of replicability.  For example, we could publish research that shows that effects do not replicate, operating within a peer-reviewed system that—for all of its faults—emphasizes evidence over personal attacks. Or, at least, it used to emphasize avoiding ad hominem attacks. In science, we avoid ad hominem attacks (those on the person or on their motives) not because scientists are perfect, but, rather, because it is too easy and devolves rapidly into a distraction from the evidence. In normal science, the editor is an umpire who calls balls and strikes. The editor should seek out diverse perspectives from diverse people, but a good editor makes sure that everyone plays fair and that the ultimate goal is winning on the basis of facts, not on the basis of impugned motives.

In summary, we have a problem with methodological rigor in some areas of the field of psychology (and the Psychonomic Society has a great deal to offer in this regard), but the opprobrium that is directed at people over this has become excessive and seems to not be gender neutral.